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Abstract
Innovators who have developed advanced technologies, along with launching new prod-
ucts by themselves, often license these technologies to their rivals. When a ¯rm launches a
new product, product positioning is also an important matter. Using a standard linear city
model with two ¯rms, we investigate how the bargaining power of the licenser a®ects the
product positions of the ¯rms. We ¯nd that the inventor more likely chooses the central
position when its bargaining power is weak. We also discuss the welfare implication. We
¯nd that the inverse U shape relationship between the bargaining power of the licenser and
total social surplus, i.e., neither too strong nor too weak bargaining power of the licensor
is optimal.
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1 Introduction
Product positioning is an important strategic tool of ¯rms. This in°uences their decisions
on other marketing-mix elements such as pricing, varieties, investments on sales advertising,
etc. Due to the di±culties involved in changing one's position, product positioning can be
a credible commitment device on decisions and has a high strategic value. Therefore, there
are many researches on product positioning decisions (Porter 1980, Hauser and Shugan 1983,
Vandenbosch and Weinberg 1995, Kotler 1999, and Sayman, Hoch, and Raju 2002).
Patent licensing is also an important strategic tool of ¯rms and is a fairly common practice
that takes place in almost all industries.1 When a ¯rm launches new products that contain
new concepts and/or technologies, both product positioning of their own products and licensing
strategies are important. A typical example is Denso, which is the largest input supplier in
Japanese automobile industry. It declared that it will drastically increase licensing revenue
from the rivals and engage in R&D to do so.
Firms launching new products take into account their licensing activities as well as their
product positions simultaneously because ¯rms have possibilities to earn additional pro¯ts if
they sell. In this paper, we try to identify the type of inside innovator that results in a central
position (or a peripheral position). To investigate this matter, we employ a standard Hotelling
model, which is familiar to many economics and marketing science researchers as a useful tool
to analyze product positioning.2 We think that our model can be applied to the situation
1 Our paper is related to the growing licensing literature in oligopoly. This literature started by Kamien
and Tauman (1984, 1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986) who analyzed licensing in standard oligopoly
models. Later studies expanded the analysis by considering general two-part tari® policies (Sen and Tauman
2007), models with di®erentiated goods (Muto 1993, Faul¶³-Oller and Sandon¶³s 2002), asymmetric information
(Gallini and Wright 1990, Beggs 1992), incumbent innovators (Shapiro 1985, Marjit 1990, Wang 1998, Kamien
and Tauman 2002), strategic delegation (Mukherjee 2001, Saracho 2002), Stackelberg leadership (Kabiraj 2004,
Filippini 2005), moral hazard (Choi 2001), or the integer problem (Sen 2005), etc.
2 The spatial competition model a la Hotelling (1929), considered to be one of the most important oligopoly
models, has been viewed by many economics and marketing researchers as an attractive framework for the
analysis of product di®erentiation (see, d'Aspremont et al. (1979), Neven (1985), and Anderson et al. (1992),
amongst others). The major advantage of this approach is that it allows for the explicit analysis of product
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where a ¯rm produces ¯nal products, and also sells key inputs to the rivals. For instance, ¯rms
producing liquid crystal displays in the television and cell phone manufacturing industries,
hybrid systems in the automobile industry, storage batteries in the computer manufacturing
industry, CCDs in the digital camera manufacturing industry sell their products directly and
also supply the key inputs to their rivals.
The structure of the model is as follows. Before the game, one inside inventor (¯rm 1)
succeeds in developing a new technology. First, it chooses its product positioning on the
Hotelling line. Following this, the rival (¯rm 2) succeeds in developing an alternative but less
e±cient technology. However, the advanced (more e±cient) technology of ¯rm 1 is protected
by a patent; as such, ¯rm 2 cannot use the most e±cient technology and produces at a higher
cost (or produces a lower quality product). After observing ¯rm 1's positioning, ¯rm 2 chooses
its position. Then, ¯rms 1 and 2 negotiate on licensing and engage in Nash bargaining. Finally,
they independently choose their prices (Bertrand competition).
We discuss the relationship between the bargaining power of the licenser (¯rm 1) and its
product positioning. We ¯nd that strong bargaining power of the licenser distorts the product
positioning and reduces total social surplus. When ¯rm 1 has a strong bargaining power, ¯rm 1
locates at the edge of the city so as to mitigate competition and to increase total pro¯ts of two
¯rms. As a result, maximal di®erentiation takes place. When ¯rm 1 has a weaker bargaining
power, it tends to choose a position closer to the center so as to reduce the pro¯t of ¯rm 2 at
status quo and to improve its bargaining position. Thus, the weaker ¯rm 1's bargaining power,
the larger the resulting market share of ¯rm 1 is. The following example can be suitable to our
selection. In line with the spatial competition model, many researchers incorporate various factors into spatial
models to investigate the degree of product di®erentiation. These include consumer distribution (Neven (1986)
and Tabuchi and Thisse (1995)), transportation costs (Economides (1986)), demand uncertainty (Casado-Izaga
(2000) and Meagher and Zauner (2004)), incomplete information (Boyer et al. (1994) and Boyer et al. (2003)),
price regulation (Bhaskar (1997) and Brekke et al. (2006)), mixed oligopoly (Cremer et al. (1991) and Matsumura
and Matsushima (2004)), multiple buying (Guo (2006) and Kim and Serfes (2006)), and tournaments (Ganuza
and Hauk (2006)).
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model prediction. Toyota is the top runner of hybrid system of automobile and supply rivals
this key input. However, Toyota is a poor negotiator and does not obtain su±cient pro¯ts from
the input supplies. At the same time, Toyota produces main stream products of hybrid cars
and chooses the central positioning of product selection rather than maximally di®erentiating
their product from the rivals that purchase the hybrid system from Toyota.
We also discuss the welfare implication. We ¯nd that the inverse U shape relationship
between the bargaining power of the licenser (¯rm 1) and total social surplus, i.e., neither too
strong nor too weak bargaining power of the licensor is optimal.
We now mention articles related to our paper. Tyagi (2000) examines the product posi-
tioning decisions of ¯rms that enter a market sequentially and that have potentially di®erent
cost structures.3 Meza and Tombak (2009) extended the model of Tyagi (2000). They discuss
an asymmetric location-price model with a Hotelling line. They discuss three main topics: (1)
endogenous timing of entries (locations), (2) mixed strategies of location, and (3) compari-
son between the social optimum and equilibrium locations. Based on the model of Meza and
Tombak (2009), we allow the e±cient ¯rm to license its advanced technology to the ine±cient
¯rm. They negotiate the contract term. That is, we add the following concern: the relation
between bargaining power and product positioning when an innovator licenses its technology.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the model. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 present the result without and with licensing, respectively. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 The model
Consider a linear city along the unit interval [0; 1], where ¯rm 1 is located at x1 and ¯rm 2
is located at 1 ¡ x2. Without loss of generality, we assume that x1 · 1 ¡ x2. Consumers are
3 Prescott and Visscher (1977), Neven (1987), and Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) also examine the sequential
product positioning decisions of forward-looking ¯rms.
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uniformly distributed along the interval. Each consumer buys exactly one unit of the good,
which can be produced by either ¯rms 1 or 2. Let pi denote the price of ¯rm i (i = 1; 2): The
utility of the consumer located at x is given by:
ux =
(
¡t(x1 ¡ x)2 ¡ p1 if bought from ¯rm 1;
¡t(1¡ x2 ¡ x)2 ¡ p2 if bought from ¯rm 2; (1)
where t represents the exogenous parameter of the transport cost incurred by the consumer.
For a consumer living at x(p1; p2; x1; x2), where
¡t(x1 ¡ x(p1; p2; x1; x2))2 ¡ p1 = ¡t(1¡ x2 ¡ x(p1; p2; x1; x2))2 ¡ p2; (2)
the utility is the same whichever of the two ¯rms is chosen. Thus, the demand facing ¯rm 1,
D1, and that facing ¯rm 2, D2, are given by:
D1(p1; p2; x1; x2) = minfmax(x(p1; p2; x1; x2); 0); 1g;
D2(p1; p2; x1; x2) = 1¡D1(p1; p2; x1; x2): (3)
We assume that one of the ¯rms (denoted as ¯rm 1) succeeds in cost-reducing innovation.4
Assume that the pre-innovation marginal costs of both ¯rms are c1 = c2 = c. Firm 1's cost-
reducing innovation lowers its marginal cost by d > 0, so that post-innovation, c1 = c¡ d and
c2 = c.
Firm 1 licenses its new technology to ¯rm 2 at rq + F , where r is the royalty rate, q is
the quantity supplied by ¯rm 2, and F is a ¯xed payment. The total royalty ¯rm 2 pays
will depend on the quantity supplied by it using the new technology. The ¯rms' negotiations
determine r and F . The bargaining procedure is based on generalized Nash bargaining.5 The
4 Instead of considering the cost reducing innovation, we can consider the following quality improving inno-
vation. Firm 1 innovates a new product with quality higher than the existing one. This new product increases
each consumer's willingness to pay by d. This model yields exactly the same location patterns and equilibrium
licensing fees as the model with cost-reducing innovation.
5 An important property of the Nash bargaining solution is that it can be implemented as the outcome of a
dynamic non-cooperative alternating-o®ers bargaining game (Binmore et al., 1986). Moreover, in the literature
of management, Brandenburger and Stuart (2007) propose a hybrid noncooperative-cooperative game model,
which is called a biform game. Based on those arguments, incorporating Nash bargaining into the Hotelling
model is reasonable.
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degree of ¯rm 1's bargaining power is ¯ (1=2 · ¯ < 1). That is, the licenser has equal or
stronger bargaining power than the licensee. Under licensing, the marginal cost of production
of ¯rm 1 is c¡ d and that of ¯rm 2 is c¡ d+ r. The royalty satis¯es r · d; otherwise, ¯rm 2
never uses the technology of ¯rm 1 even after accepting the licensing contract.6
The game runs as follows. In the ¯rst stage, ¯rm 1 choose its location x1 2 [0; 1=2] (by
symmetry, x1 ¸ 1=2 is equivalent to 1 ¡ x1(· 1=2)). Observing the location of ¯rm 1, ¯rm 2
chooses its location x2 2 [0; 1].7 In the second stage, r and F are determined by the negotiations
between the ¯rms. In the third stage, each ¯rm i (i = 1:2) chooses its price pi 2 [ci;1)
independently.8
3 No-licensing case
In this section, we discuss the case where the innovator (¯rm 1) does not license its advanced
technology as a benchmark. We discuss licensing explicitly in the next section.
Without licensing, the pro¯t functions of the ¯rms are as follows:
¼N1 = (p1 ¡ (c¡ d))D1(x1; x2; p1; p2); ¼N2 = (p2 ¡ c)D2(x1; x2; p1; p2);
where superscript N indicates the no licensing case.
First, we investigate the price competition stage. Given the locations of ¯rms x1 and x2,
¯rms face Bertrand competition. The equilibrium prices are as follows:
pN1 =
8<:
c¡ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(1¡ x1 + x2) if d ¸ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2);
3c¡ 2d+ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3 + x1 ¡ x2)
3
if d < t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2);
6 Even though ¯rm 2 accepted a contract term with r > d, it would not use the licensing technology because
it is more expensive to using its own less e±cient technology. Anticipating the action of ¯rm 2, ¯rm 1 recognizes
that the marginal cost of ¯rm 2 remains c ¡ d. This outcome is similar to that in which ¯rm 2 rejects the
licensing o®er. This is equivalent to the no-licensing case in Section 3.
7 Meza and Tombak (2009) show that the e±cient ¯rm ¯rst chooses its location and then the ine±cient ¯rm
does when the timing of the locations is endogenously determined. Their result supports the timing structure
employed in this paper.
8 Choosing pi < ci is weakly dominated by choosing pi = ci; hence, we assume that the lower bound of the
price is its cost.
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pN2 =
8<:
c if d ¸ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2);
3c¡ d+ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2)
3
if d < t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2):
If d ¸ t(1 ¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3 ¡ x1 + x2), D1 = 1 and D2 = 0 (monopoly by ¯rm 1 with ¯rm 2 only
serving as a potential competitor). If d < t(1 ¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3 ¡ x1 + x2), D1 > 0; D2 > 0 (both
¯rms produce in the market).
The resulting pro¯ts of the ¯rms are as follows:
¼N1 =
8><>:
d¡ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(1¡ x1 + x2) if d ¸ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2);
(d+ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3 + x1 ¡ x2))2
18t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2) if d < t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2);
(4)
¼N2 =
8><>:
0 if d ¸ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2);
(t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2)¡ d)2
18t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2) if d < t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2):
(5)
Second, we consider the location choice of ¯rm 2. Given the location of ¯rm 1 x1, ¯rm 2
decides its location.9
Lemma 1 For any x1(· 1=2), the optimal location of ¯rm 2 is 1 (x2 = 0).
As pointed out by d'Aspremont et al. (1979), to mitigate price competition, ¯rm 2 maximizes
the degree of product di®erentiation given the location of ¯rm 1.
Third, we consider the location choice of ¯rm 1. After several calculations, we have the
following lemma:
Lemma 2 (Meza and Tombak (2009, p.692)) When the locations are sequentially determined,
the optimal location of ¯rm 1 is
x1 =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if d · t;
t¡p(4t¡ 3d)t
3t
if t < d · (29
p
145¡ 187)t
128
' 1:267t;
1
2
if
(29
p
145¡ 187)t
128
· d:
(6)
9 Note that, if d > t(1¡ x1)(3¡ x1), it is indi®erent for ¯rm 2 to choose any location.
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****************************
Figure 1 here
***************************
Lemma 2 states that x1 is increasing in d. A stronger advantage of ¯rm 1 makes its location
closer to the center. This result suggests that the stronger ¯rm is more likely to choose a central
position when it does not license its advanced technology.
We brie°y mention the mechanism of the result. When cost asymmetry is not signi¯cant, a
similar strategic interaction in d'Aspremont et al. (1979) works. Mitigating price competition
between the ¯rms is important for them and the products are maximally di®erentiated. When
cost asymmetry of the ¯rms is signi¯cant, the price e®ect does not work. As pointed out by
Ziss (1993), when the cost asymmetry is signi¯cant, the optimal location of the e±cient ¯rm
is the same as that chosen by the ine±cient ¯rm because monopolizing the market is the best
choice for the e±cient ¯rm.10 The mechanism described by Ziss (1993) works in our model.
The follower chooses the location as far as possible from the location of the leader. Thus, if
the cost advantage is signi¯cant, the leader chooses the center position so as to minimize the
resulting di®erentiation.
4 Licensing case
We consider the model where there is bargaining over licensing. We provide three stages to
derive the equilibrium outcomes: (1) pricing stage, (2) licensing stage, and (3) location stage.
First, consider the pricing stage. Under the licensing contract, the pro¯ts of the ¯rms are
as follows:
¼L1 = (p1 ¡ (c¡ d))D1 + rD2 + F
= (p1 ¡ (c¡ d))D1 + r(1¡D1) + F
10 If the e±cient ¯rm locates at a di®erent point, to monopolize the market it must set its price as c2 ¡ ® (®
depends on the distance between the ¯rms).
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= (p1 ¡ (c¡ d)¡ r)D1 + r + F; (7)
¼L2 = (p2 ¡ (c¡ d)¡ r)D2 ¡ F: (8)
Consider the price competition at the last stage. The ¯rst-order conditions lead to the following:
p1 = (c+ r ¡ d) + t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3 + x1 ¡ x2)3
p2 = (c+ r ¡ d) + t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2)3 :
Substituting the prices into the pro¯t functions in (7) and (8), we have
¼L1 =
t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3 + x1 ¡ x2)2
18
+ r + F; (9)
¼L2 =
t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2)2
18
¡ F: (10)
Note that the pro¯t functions of the ¯rms are similar to those in d'Aspremont et al. (1979)
except for the second and third terms (r + F and ¡F ). When ¯rm 1 licenses its advanced
technology, per unit licensing fee r acts as an opportunity cost of ¯rm 1. If ¯rm 1 decreases its
price, the quantity supplied by it increases but the payment by ¯rm 2 decreases. Therefore, this
licensing case is similar to the competition between two symmetric ¯rms (see (7) and (8)). If r
and F were exogenously given, maximum di®erentiation would appear (x1 = x2 = 0) and then
the joint pro¯t would be maximized in equilibrium (Matsumura et al. (2010)). As mentioned
later, when the ¯rms negotiate with each other, this prediction does not always hold.
Next, consider the licensing stage. The ¯rms negotiate the levels of r and F . The negotiation
process is based on generalized Nash bargaining. In the model, the process is described as
follows:
max
r;F
¯ log[¼L1 ¡ ¼N1 ] + (1¡ ¯) log[¼L2 ¡ ¼N2 ]; (11)
where ¼Li is the pro¯t of ¯rm i (i = 1; 2) when ¯rm 1 licenses its technology and ¼
N
i is the pro¯t
of ¯rm i (i = 1; 2) in which ¯rm 1 does not. As mentioned in the previous section, we have to
consider two cases: (i) d < t(1 ¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3 ¡ x1 + x2); (ii) d ¸ t(1 ¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3 ¡ x1 + x2).
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Using (4), (5), (9), and (10), we solve the maximization problem in (11).11 In the maximization
problem, only ¼L1 includes r. ¼
L
1 is monotonically increasing in r (see (9)). Since r · d, we
have the following lemma:
Lemma 3 In any case, r = d. F is given by
F =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
d[2(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3(3¯ ¡ 2)¡ (2¯ ¡ 1)(x1 ¡ x2))t¡ (2¯ ¡ 1)d]
18t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)
if d < t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2);
(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2)(3(4¯ ¡ 3)¡ (2¯ ¡ 1)(x1 ¡ x2))t
18
if d ¸ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2):
(12)
To understand how the locations of the ¯rms a®ect the bargaining solution in (11), we
examine the relation between ¯xed payment F and the locations of the ¯rms. Di®erentiating
F with respect to x1, we have
@F
@x1
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
¡d(2¯ ¡ 1)(2t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)
2 + d)
18t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)2 if d < t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2);
¡ t(2¯ ¡ 1)x2(2¡ 2x1 ¡ x2)
18
+
t(39¡ 26x1 + 3x21 ¡ 2(27¡ 20x1 + 3x21)¯)
18
if d ¸ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2);
(13)
As shown in the following Lemma 4, x2 = 0 in equilibrium, that is, ¯rm 2 prefers maximum
di®erentiation given the location of ¯rm 1. Substituting x2 = 0 into the partial derivative, we
have
@F
@x1
¯¯¯¯
x2=0
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
¡d(2¯ ¡ 1)(2t(1¡ x1)
2 + d)
18t(1¡ x1)2 if d < t(1¡ x1)(3¡ x1);
t(39¡ 26x1 + 3x21 ¡ 2(27¡ 20x1 + 3x21)¯)
18
if d ¸ t(1¡ x1)(3¡ x1):
(14)
Note that the second value in (14) is always positive (negative) if ¯ < 13=18 ' 0:722 (¯ = 1).
11 The inequality, ¼L1 · ¼N1 , never appear in the maximization problem because log[¼L1 ¡ ¼N1 ] does not have a
value. In other words, the inequality ¼L1 > ¼
N
1 must be hold. That is, ¯rm 1 always has an incentive to license
its technology.
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From the partial derivative, we ¯nd that when the cost di®erence between the ¯rms is
signi¯cant and the bargaining power of ¯rm 1 is weak, moving toward the center can increase
the ¯xed payment for ¯rm 1. We explain the intuition. We consider the threat point of
the bargaining (competitive pro¯ts without licensing). As mentioned in the previous section,
when the cost asymmetry d is large, as the degree of product di®erentiation decreases, the non
licensing pro¯t of ¯rm 1 can increase while that of ¯rm 2 certainly decreases. Therefore, a
decrease in the degree of product di®erentiation can enhance the bargaining position of ¯rm 1.
Now, we add explanations about the partial derivative mentioned above. When the bargaining
power of ¯rm 1 is weak, ¯rm 1 cannot fully extract the bene¯t of licensing from ¯rm 2 through
the ¯xed fee, F . As mentioned earlier (see the discussion after equations (9) and (10)), since
per unit licensing fee r acts as an opportunity cost of ¯rm 1, ¯rm 1 does not have to deprive
the demand of ¯rm 2. The bene¯t of licensing is caused by the mitigation of competition
between the ¯rms. The direct bene¯t is maximized when the ¯rms maximally di®erentiate
their products. Through the negotiation, ¯rm 1 (partially) extracts the direct bene¯t. When
¯rm 1 has weaker bargaining power, the diminish in the threat point of ¯rm 2 is more important
than the direct bene¯t because the direct bene¯t is small. The partial derivative of F re°ects
this fact.
Third, we consider the location choice of ¯rm 2. Given the location of ¯rm 1, x1, ¯rm 2
decides its location x2. Using (10) and F in (12), we solve the maximization problem of ¯rm
2 and then we have
Lemma 4 For any x1(· 1=2), the optimal location of ¯rm 2 is 1 (x2 = 0).
Finally, we consider the location choice by ¯rm 1. Using (9) and F in (12), we solve the
maximization problem of ¯rm 1. The following proposition states the equilibrium location of
¯rm 1. This indicates that x1 is decreasing in ¯, that is, as the bargaining power of ¯rm 1
becomes weak, its location choice tends to the center.
11
Proposition 1 With licensing, the equilibrium location of ¯rm 1 is as follows:
x1 =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1
2
if
1
2
· ¯ · 36
71
and d ¸ da(¯)t;
¡9 + 10¯ +p81¡ 126¯ + 19¯2
3¯
if
36
71
· ¯ · 2
3
and d ¸ db(¯)t;
0 otherwise.
where
da(¯) ´ 6(3¯¡2)+
p
90¡269¯+214¯2
2(2¯¡1) ,
db(¯) ´ 27¯(3¯¡2)+
p
3(1963¯4+5026¯3¡16551¯2+12636¯¡2916¡4(2¯¡1)(81¡216¯+19¯2)3=2)
9¯(2¯¡1) :
****************************
Figures 2a and 2b here
***************************
Proposition 1 states that with licensing, x1 is decreasing or non-increasing in ¯ when d is
large enough. This result indicates that ¯rm 1's (the inventor's) location choice tends to the
center when its bargaining power is weaker. These results show that a cost advantage and
bargaining power have di®erent implications for product positioning.
We now brie°y mention the mechanism of the result. When ¯rm 1 licenses its technology,
joint pro¯t is maximized if the ¯rms maximally di®erentiate their products. Firm 1 earns an
additional pro¯t through ¯xed payment F , which depends on the bargaining power. If ¯rm
1's bargaining power is weak, increasing the degree of product di®erentiation has two e®ects.
One, there is an increase in the pro¯t through price competition (per unit payment r) and two,
there is a decrease in the pro¯t through ¯xed payment. Firm 1 has to balance two contrary
e®ects. This yields our Proposition 1.
We now brie°y discuss the welfare implication. There is an inverted U relationship between
bargaining power ¯ and social surplus. In this setting, both ¯rms have the same marginal cost,
and the price competition between the ¯rms is similar to that in d'Aspremont et al. (1979).
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Given the locations of the ¯rms (x1 and x2 = 0), the indi®erence consumer x¤ and the total
transport costs TC are as follows:
x¤ =
3 + x1
6
; TC =
Z x1
0
(x1 ¡ x)2dx+
Z x¤
x1
(x¡ x1)2dx+
Z 1
x¤
(1¡ x)2dx
=
3¡ 9x1 + 13x21 + 5x31
36
:
On the domain [0; 1=2], TC is a convex function and minimized at x1 = (4
p
19 ¡ 13)=15 '
0:2957. That is, social surplus ¡TC is maximized when x1 = (4
p
19 ¡ 13)=15. As mentioned
earlier, there is an inverse relationship between ¯ and x1 (when d is large, as the value of ¯
increases, the value of x1 decreases). When ¯ = 1=2 (¯ = 1), x1 = 1=2 (x1 = 0). Therefore,
there is an inverted U relationship between bargaining power ¯ and social surplus.
****************************
Figure 3 here
***************************
5 Concluding remarks
We have investigated the relationship between licensing activities and equilibrium locations in
a product di®erentiation model. We formulate a model where both the innovator (licenser)
and the licensee produce. We take into account a bargaining procedure between the licenser
and the licensee. Without licensing, the degree of the cost advantage of the licenser a®ects its
positioning; a stronger cost advantage results in a more central positioning. With licensing,
the degree of the cost advantage of the licenser does not a®ect its positioning; however, its
bargaining power over the licensee does have an e®ect on the positioning. A weaker bargaining
power results in a more central positioning.
In this paper, we restrict our attentions to the post-innovation stage and focus on the
product positioning. The bargaining power of the inventors a®ects innovation activities and
thus a®ects welfare. This is left for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that d · t(1 ¡ x1)(3 ¡ x1). Di®erentiating ¼N2 with respect
to x2, we have
@¼N2
@x2
= ¡(t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2)¡ d)(t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(5¡ 3x1 ¡ x2) + d)
18t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)2 < 0:
Therefore, x2 = 0 is optimal. Suppose that d > t(1¡ x1)(3¡ x1). Any x2 yields zero pro¯ts of
¯rm 2, thus any location can be optimal for ¯rm 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: The ¯rst-order condition of ¯rm 2 is
@¼2
@x2
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
¡(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)2(3¡ x1 + x2)(1 + x1 + 3x2)t2
18t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)2
+
d(2¯ ¡ 1)(d¡ 2(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)2t)
18t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)2
if d < t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2);
¡ t(9 + x1(2¡ x1) + 2x2(8¡ x1) + 3x
2
2)(1¡ ¯)
9
< 0
if d ¸ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2):
We now show that the ¯rst value is also negative. When d = t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2), the
former part is maximized and then its value is given by:
@¼2
@x2
¯¯¯¯
d=t(1¡x1¡x2)(3¡x1+x2)
= ¡ t(3¡ x1 + x2)(1 + x1 + 3x2)(1¡ ¯)
9
< 0:
Therefore, x2 = 0 is the optimal choice of ¯rm 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we derive the local optimal location of ¯rm 1 under the two
cases: (1) d < t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2) and (2) d ¸ t(1¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3¡ x1 + x2). Second, we
compare the two optimal locations and show the global optimal location of ¯rm 1.
We consider the case where d < t(1 ¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3 ¡ x1 + x2). Given the reaction of ¯rm 2
(x2 = 0), the ¯rst-order condition of ¯rm 1 is:
@¼1
@x1
= ¡(1¡ x1)
2(3 + x1)(1 + 3x1) + d(2¯ ¡ 1)(d+ 2(1¡ x1)2)
18(1¡ x1)2 < 0: (15)
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When d < t(1¡x1¡x2)(3¡x1+x2), x1 = 0 is the local optimal location of ¯rm 1. The pro¯t
of ¯rm 1 is:
¼1A ´ 9t
2 + 6td(1 + 3¯) + d2(1¡ 2¯)
18t
: (16)
We consider the case where d ¸ t(1 ¡ x1 ¡ x2)(3 ¡ x1 + x2). Given the reaction of ¯rm 2
(x2 = 0), the ¯rst-order condition of ¯rm 1 is:
@¼1
@x1
=
t(9(2¡ 3¯)¡ 2(9¡ 19¯)x1 ¡ 3¯x21)
9
: (17)
If ¯ ¸ 2=3, this is always negative and the local optimal location for ¯rm 1 is x1 = 0. >From
the equation @¼1=@x1 = 0, we have a candidate of the local optimal location:
x1 =
¡9 + 10¯ +p81¡ 126¯ + 19¯2
3¯
:
From a simple calculation, we ¯nd that this is larger than 1=2 if ¯ < 36=71. We can summarize
these calculations as follows:
x1 =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1
2
if
1
2
· ¯ · 36
71
;
¡9 + 10¯ +p81¡ 126¯ + 19¯2
3¯
if
36
71
· ¯ · 2
3
;
0 if
2
3
· ¯:
(18)
We have to derive the condition that x1 in each case satis¯es the inequality d ¸ t(1 ¡ x1 ¡
x2)(3¡ x1 + x2) = (1¡ x1)(3¡ x1). Substituting x1 into the inequality, we have
x1 =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
1
2
if
1
2
· ¯ · 36
71
and d ¸ 5
4
;
¡9 + 10¯ +p81¡ 126¯ + 19¯2
3¯
if
36
71
· ¯ · 2
3
; and
d ¸ 2(81¡99¯+13¯2¡(9¡4¯)
p
81¡126¯+19¯2)
9¯2
;
0 if
2
3
· ¯ and d ¸ 3:
(19)
If the condition is not satis¯ed in each case, the local optimal location is the corner solution
that is inferior to the local optimal location (x1 = 0) in the former case (d < t(1¡x1¡x2)(3¡
15
x1 + x2) = (1¡ x1)(3¡ x1)). The pro¯t of ¯rm 1 is:
¼1B ´
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
d+
(55¯ ¡ 18)t
72
if x1 =
1
2
;
d+
2(7¯ ¡ 9)(81¡ 126¯ + 4¯2)t
243¯2
if x1 =
¡9 + 10¯ +p81¡ 126¯ + 19¯2
3¯
:
+
2(81¡ 126¯ + 19¯2)3=2t
243¯2
(20)
Finally, we compare the two local optimal locations. Comparing ¼1A with ¼1B, we have
Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: The optimal location of ¯rm 1
Horizontal: d, Vertical: x1
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